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The rich rule over the poor, and the borrower is servant to the lender.
Proverbs 22:71
I. INTRODUCTION
EVELOPING-country external debt is an economic, social, and
political issue. The debt weighs heavily on the shoulders of the
debtor nations, crippling their domestic social and economic pro-
grams, as well as preventing them from participating effectively in inter-
national activities such as trade. Individuals and families in these
countries are deprived of even the most basic elements of living. The
debt problem also affects the rich/creditor nations as developing coun-
tries with stagnating or crippled economies cannot be effective trading
partners. Furthermore, the social and economic strife caused by the crip-
pling debt has a domino knock-down effect on the richer nations.
The debt problem has been around continuously for over thirty years.
2
Countries that have faced debt crises at different periods are geographi-
cally widespread: from Mexico and Argentina; Poland and Romania; Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, and Nigeria; Philippines and Indonesia; to Uganda,
Professor, Department of Law, University of Essex, United Kingdom; L.L.B.
(Hons) at Makerere University; Dip. L.P. at Law Development Center; L.L.M.
and Ph.D. at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Canada; Ad-
vocate in Uganda. For some early contribution to the research, I am grateful to
Kathleen Wakeling, a former L.L.M. student at the University of Essex.
1. Proverbs 22:7 (New International Version).
2. The expression "debt crisis" is commonly associated with countries that have
heavy to moderate indebtedness, the large majority of which are largely in Africa,
Asia and, Latin America. This article is based on the narrower meaning of the
expression. In broader terms, the same expression encompasses a large number of
international and national financial crises, the most notable of which were the in-
ternational financial crisis that occurred in the Southern Cone in the late 1970s; the
third world debt crisis of the early 1980s; the savings and loan debt crisis in the
United States in the late 1980s; India's balance of payments crisis in 1991; the
ERM crisis in 1992; the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the crisis that followed in
Latin America; the East Asian financial crisis of 1997; the Russian meltdown in
1998-99; the collapse of the Real in Brazil and its follow up in Latin America in
1998-99; the Turkish crisis in 2000; the Iraqi debt problem of 2004; and the Argen-
tinian debt problem of 2004. See Daniel Bradlow & Ruxandra Burdescue, At the
Mercy of Vultures: Sovereign Creditors in Courts, in AD HONOREM ION DOGARU:
STUDII JURIDICE ALESE 189 (Rumania 2005).
860 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
Tanzania, and Mozambique. Creditors fall into different categories, but
what binds them together is the global impact of the debt crisis. The
creditors include multilateral agencies and bilateral lenders/official credi-
tors, both of whom provide an additional particular type of credit, which
is aid in the form of a concession. 3 The debts of multi-lateral agencies,
such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and IBRD (International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, part of the World Bank) are,
in case of default, renegotiated through the IMF, while the debts bilateral
lenders/official creditors are, in case of default, renegotiated through the
Paris Club. The third type of lender consists of private commercial lend-
ers whose debt, in case of default, is renegotiated through the London
Club. An altogether different type of financing is the investment in
bonds, equities, or other securities; this type of funding brings its own
particular and significant problems because it is amenable to swift capital
flight, the creditors are geographically dispersed, and sometimes the cred-
itors are anonymous. It has been known to present significant problems
because of the speed at which the securities can be sold or withdrawn.
Thus, the debt crisis is a global phenomenon even though it usually asso-
ciated with Latin America and to a lesser extent Africa. Furthermore,
the crisis affects the global financial system; that is the commercial banks
as lenders, governments (as borrowers and lenders), and multi-lateral fi-
nancial institutions as lenders and overseers of the global economy.
The borrowed funds have been utilized for various projects over the
years, depending on both the needs of the borrower nations and on the
prevailing development philosophy at any particular time in Washington
and London. Early post-independence (1950s-1960s) multilateral agency
loans emphasized the development of infrastructure, for example roads,
dams, schools, and hospitals. The next phase focused on the development
of export markets and import substitution. At the turn of the 21st cen-
tury the loans have emphasized capacity building in democratization,
governance, and the rule of law. Most recently, loans have predomi-
nantly focused on universal primary education, health, gender equality,
and environmental sustainability.4 Some of these aims do not directly or
immediately give rise to export earnings to offset the payment of interest
3. This is sometimes misleadingly referred to as foreign direct investment. Foreign
direct investment (FDI) is actually a contrasting financing method, consisting of
investment in productive foreign assets such as equipment, structures, and
organizations.
4. The loans reflect the broader agenda of the Millennium Development Goals of: (1)
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieving universal primary educa-
tion; (3) promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women; (4) reduc-
tion of child mortality; (5) improving maternal health; (6) combating HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (8) de-
veloping a global partnership for development. See, e.g., U.N. Millennium Project,
http://unmillenniumproject.org (last. visited Oct. 15, 2007); Africa and the Millen-
nium Development Goals 2007 Update, U.N. Department of Public Information,
Document No. DPI/2458 June 2007, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/docs/
MDGafrica07.pdf.
2007] DEVELOPING-COUNTRY EXTERNAL DEBT 861
and repayment of the loan, and for that reason these aims could be con-
sidered non-self replenishing.
At different periods in history there has been emphasis on particular
types of debt. For instance, while international syndicated loans were
popular in the 1970s, foreign direct lending and private investment have
been more commonplace in recent years. In addition, a number of fac-
tors prevented the debtor nations from repaying the loans. For these rea-
sons, it is not possible to discuss accurately all debt-even for the same
country-because of the different permutations involved.
There were many causes of the debt crisis. Some causes were directly
attributable to the debtor countries-and they explain why there is some
resistance for debt forgiveness-while other causes are not. The crisis
arose from excessive borrowing, inefficient and ill-thought-out economic
policies, and corruption within debtor governments. 5 The creditor na-
tions too shared part of the blame. There was excessive lending by pri-
vate banks awash with petrodollars and eager to recycle them.
Industrialized nations were also eager to lend during the Cold War in
order to secure the political allegiance of corrupt and totalitarian re-
gimes.6 It was (and still remains) the case that a good percentage of the
borrowed funds either did not leave the bank accounts in the creditor
nations or in any event ended up in those same accounts.
The debt was also worsened by the fluctuations of the international
economy. The two oil shocks froml973-1974 and 1979-1980, the decline
in the prices for copper and coffee in the 1980s and 1990s, the tightening
of monetary policy in the United States which drove up interest rates in
the 1980s, and occasional recessions in the global economy, which re-
duced demand for exports from developing countries, all contributed to
the debt crisis.
Many solutions have been suggested over the last twenty or so years;
and if the problem were simple, it would have been resolved by now. For
this reason, this article focuses on the more recent suggestions involving
the majority of debtor nations. It only mentions earlier alternatives to
provide a fuller context.
The proposed solutions to the debt problem fall into opposing catego-
ries: those which offer creditors some hope of recovering their funds, en-
suring that the creditors' investments produce the expected return, and
those which give priority to the interests of the debtor nations by calling
for the debt to be cancelled. The economic and social implications of the
various options will be discussed below, along with the legal principles
upon which they might be based.
5. Chantal Thomas, International Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty Reduction, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711, 1714 (2000).
6. Id.; RuMu SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 93-98 (J.
J. Norton ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 1999).
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A. COMMON MYTHS
The search for solutions to the debt problem often encounters common
myths, both in favor of and against developing countries. One such myth
is to say that developing countries, particularly those in Africa, are "bas-
ket cases" or "lost causes". In reality, some developing countries are now
well-managed and can benefit from debt relief. Of the remainder, many
are now better managed, both economically and politically, than they
were a decade or so ago. This is largely due to the adjustment programs
imposed by the IMF as part of the conditions for external borrowing and
debt relief,7 and the positive effects of globalization and international de-
velopment. Globalization has led to increased awareness on the part of
the citizens of the world and increased demands for accountability in po-
litical and economic governance. Due to increased interaction at all po-
litical levels right up to the United Nations, leaders worldwide are now,
more than ever, accountable or under pressure to account for their
actions.
The second myth is that developing countries are the only victims of
the negative effects of international finance or international trade and
globalization. In reality, all countries of the world suffer the negative ef-
fects of globalization from time to time. From fishermen and farmers to
investment bankers and stockbrokers, the global economy presents chal-
lenges to everybody. What differentiates developing countries is that
their already fragile economic systems are more easily destabilized by
negative changes in the global economy.
The third myth is to argue that the only way to solve the debt crisis is
for the debtor nations to pay off all their debt. This is neither essential,
nor particularly desirable because debt, per se, is not bad, nor is the use
of debt to finance growth. Debt has many advantages, for example, it can
fund projects where current revenues are insufficient or unavailable. The
ultimate goal should be debt sustainability rather than debt elimination:
not necessarily when a country has repaid all its external debt, but rather
when that country is able to service its external debt without the need to
compromise important domestic policies or endure prolonged austerity
measures on its part or that of the creditors. 8
7. For discussion of IMF conditionality, see International Monetary Fund, Articles of
Agreement, art. V, § 3(a) (as amended Nov. 11, 1992) [hereinafter IMF]; JOSEPH
GOLD, CONDITIONALITY (Pamphlet Series No. 31, International Monetary Fund
1979); MANUEL GUITIAN, FUND CONDITIONALITY: EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICES (Pamphlet Series No. 38, International Monetary Fund 1981); and
for more recent discussion, see LEGAL & POLICY DEV. & REVIEW DEPT., INT'L
MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY (International Monetary
Fund 2002), http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf.
8. ROGER E. SHIELDS, ASPECTS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEMS: IS
THE PROBLEM OF INSOLVENCY OR ILLIQUIDITY? 6 (American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research 1985).
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II. CONVENTIONAL DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS
A. DEBT AND DEBT COLLECTION
When credit is provided, a debtor-creditor relationship is created
whereby the creditor earns the right to repayment. There is an obligation
on the debtor to repay, and a right for the creditor to enforce payment.
Debt normally earns interest, which is the charge for using someone
else's funds. Alternatively, it can be seen as remuneration for the lender.
Under municipal law, a debtor who refuses to pay will be subject to one
of the alternative methods for debt collection. The first alternative con-
sists of contractual remedies that become operative when the debtor is
unable to pay, but has made a prior arrangement with the creditor
whereby the creditor will take possession of an item belonging to the
debtor if the debtor fails to pay. A slight variation of this alternative
could be that the debtor will offer something of value to the creditor that
the creditor will accept in exchange for his or her debt. So, while no
formal agreement was made, the creditor will accept something in ex-
change for the release of the debt. The second alternative includes court
remedies such as levying execution or garnishee proceedings. But these
situations usually apply only when the debtor refuses to pay. If the
debtor is simply unable to pay, the appropriate debt collection process is
bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. Another practical alternative,
which is not exactly a debt collection remedy, is the renegotiation of the
loan whereby the parties agree on a new contractual framework for the
repayment of the same loan.
B. INSOLVENCY
Insolvency occurs when one is unable to pay one's debts as they be-
come due from one's own money.9 This leads to "cash-flow" or "com-
mercial" insolvency. A temporary lack of liquidity, as opposed to an
endemic shortage of working capital, does not amount to insolvency.10
There is a difference between debtors who can pay their debts there and
then (or within a short period of time) and those who need some time to
raise the money. Debtors who need extra time are not solvent." But the
debtor's financial position is not limited to his or her cash resources. The
courts will also take into account money that the debtor can raise within a
relatively short time depending on the nature of the business and the
amount of the debts.12 Ultimately, the circumstances of each person's
entire financial position are taken into account in determining whether or
9. M & R Jones Shoplifting Co. v. Nat'l Bank of A/asia Ltd. (1983) 68 F.L.R. 282,
285. See generally ANDREW R. KEAY & PETER WALTON, INSOLVENCY LAW: COR-
PORATE AND PERSONAL 15-19 (Pearson Educ. 2003); IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW
OF INSOLVENCY 1-001-1-011 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 2002).
10. Expo Int'l Party Ltd. v. Chant (1979) 4 A.C.L.R. 679; Bank of Australasia v. Hall
(1907) 4 C.L.R. 1514, 1543; In re Timbatec Party Ltd. (1974) 24 F.L.R. 30, 37.
11. In re Whitgift Nominees Party. Ltd. (1983) 68 F.L.R. 258; In re Noye, Deputy
Comm'r of Taxation Ctr. Exp. (1956) 18 A.B.C. 77.
12. Sandell v. Porter (1966) 115 C.L.R. 666.
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not there is insolvency, including cash resources and what the debtor can
raise by pledging its assets. 13
Historically, the main objective of bankruptcy/insolvency law was to
provide for an orderly distribution of the debtor's assets by way of pay-
ment to creditors on a pari passu or pro-rata basis. This objective re-
mains of paramount importance today, even though some jurisdictions,
most notably the United States, places higher emphasis on the rehabilita-
tion of the debtor. In essence, bankruptcy law is a legal process of debt
collection that emphasizes collective action, where the debtor is unable to
pay their debts.14 The law reconciles the opposing interests 15 of creditors
and the insolvent debtor by setting up elaborate legal regimes; namely,
bankruptcy (for individuals and partnerships) and the liquidation of com-
panies. 16 The law also provides for extra-curial regimes; namely, deeds of
assignment, composition scheme, and deeds of arrangement. 17
There are three main objectives of bankruptcy law: the protection of
creditors, the protection of the debtor, and benefiting the community as a
whole. The relative importance of these objectives varies from one juris-
diction to another, with English law emphasizing the first objective while
United States law emphasizes the second one.
1. Protect Creditors
First, bankruptcy law protects creditors as a group by preserving the
debtor's assets and distributing them ratably. Bankruptcy stops any con-
duct that would be detrimental to the ratable distribution. Thus, the pro-
ceedings are essentially collective, and their aim is to distribute the estate
in the most economical and expeditious manner. In order to achieve
these aims, the proceedings are compulsory-neither the debtor nor the
creditor can sidestep the bankruptcy proceedings. Secondly, bankruptcy
law protects creditors from one another. It does this by avoiding the con-
flict of competing for specific assets, and avoiding the high cost of moni-
toring what everybody else is doing.
13. Hymix Concrete Party. v. Garrity (1977) 13 A.L.R. 321.
14. When people or businesses borrow money, they may fail to repay the money. This
can occur for different reasons: mismanagement or bad planning, recession, high
interest rates, unexpected tort liability, bad luck, or primary industries factors such
as drought or flood.
15. Policy makers must address at least three questions: (1) Can we assume/ trust that
the debtor has declared all his/her property?; (2) Should we place limits on what
property is available for distribution among creditors?; and (3) How do we resolve
conflicting rights among different creditors when there are insufficient assets to
fulfill all of the debts?
16. "Insolvency" is a broader expression that includes both bankruptcy and liquida-
tion. Depending on the context, "insolvency" could mean exactly the same thing
as "bankruptcy" or "liquidation."
17. In some cases these schemes are backed by court orders or other interventions to
make them work.
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2. Protect the Debtor
From the moment the bankruptcy proceedings commence, actions
against the debtor are stayed. This ensures that the debtor is free from
the pressure of creditors. Furthermore, bankruptcies are normally dis-
charged after a reasonable period, varying between one and five years in
the United States. A bankrupt individual who has been unfortunate, but
not dishonest should be discharged, given a fresh start, and a resumption
of normal status.
3. Benefits to the Community
Bankruptcy law provides that a debtor against whom a bankruptcy or-
der is made has limited commercial dealings so that the bankrupt cannot
defraud others. The second benefit is that a discharged bankrupt is inte-
grated back in the community, thus recycling entrepreneurial skills.
Thirdly, the protection of the debtor's estate preserves venture capital
and jobs.
The success of the law in addressing debtor-creditor relations is mea-
sured by asking specifically: (1) Is the procedure efficient, without unnec-
essary cost and time-consuming procedures?; and (2) Does the procedure
prevent exploitation by whoever may be so minded?
III. THE NATURE OF THE DEBT PROBLEM
In the 1980s, the debtor nations were unable to pay their external debt
and either refused to pay at all or postponed payment. This applied to
either interest, principal, or foreign denominated debt, and was achieved
by either unilateral declarations of postponement (moratoria) or
rescheduling. In the wake of these developments, it was realized that
there was no central authority or forum to oversee an orderly resolution
to the crisis; for example, a global bankruptcy system. This role was even-
tually assumed by the IMF, which acted as a lender of last resort. In
more recent years, the problem has been that the debt is unsustainable
for the large majority of the least developed countries. That is to say,
servicing external debt (payments of interest and repayments of princi-
pal) consumes such a high percentage of the countries' resources that
other domestic economic and social programs are put in jeopardy.
An important consideration in recent discourse about sovereign debt is
the type of creditors. The earlier sovereign debt, or pre-1980 debt, was
predominantly held by commercial banks and bilateral lenders. Largely
as a result of the Brady Plan, whereby commercial bank debt was ex-
changed for bonds, 18 and partly also because new debt was contracted by
18. The Brady Plan was the more successful of two plans-the other being the Baker
Plan-for reducing sovereign debt by converting it from commercial bank loans to
widely-held bonds. The Brady Plan was instituted in 1989 and has been expanded
since. See TRADE ASS'N FOR EMERGING MARKETS, THE BRADY PLAN, http://
www.emta.org/emarkets/brady.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); LEX RIEFFEL, RE-
STRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD Hoc MACHINERY 149-77
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way of international bonds, the creditors to many sovereign states today
consist of bondholders. The poorest of countries, though, still rely on
bilateral lenders and multilateral agencies. The difference in the type of
creditors as well as the debtors foreshadows the reality that the solutions
to the debt crisis necessarily have to be different.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE DEBT PROBLEM
The international community has created, or attempted to create, sev-
eral solutions for the debt crisis. Some of these are designed to balance
the economic interests of the creditors and debtors by ensuring that the
creditors ultimately get full repayment, while the debtor obtains some
concessions, for example, more time within which to pay. Other options
are designed to clear the debt as soon as possible.
A. DEBT RE-FRAMING
The solutions categorized as "debt-framing" give the debtor some
breathing space, but the debt itself substantially remains and may even
become bigger. They include debt restructuring, trading in debt (the sec-
ondary market in debt), and debt-for-equity swaps.
1. Debt Restructuring and Debt Rescheduling
Debt restructuring (and rescheduling) is a solution that has already
been implemented for a great many developing countries. Generally, it
involves the renegotiation and modification of the contractual terms of
the loan to enhance the borrower's chances of full payment of the loan.
The borrower obtains concessions, such as extensions or a write-off of
part of the debt. Furthermore, the orderly management of the debt is
generally beneficial to both sides because it may prevent the debtor from
falling into deeper economic chaos. But the interest on the loan contin-
ues to accrue at a rate equal to or greater than the bank's average cost of
funds at the date of restructuring. Restructuring usually involves the con-
solidation of many debt contracts into just a few, with the accompanying
standardization of their clauses, and a reduction in the number of debt-
ors, so that the debts of many corporations became instead the debt of
the central bank with the sovereign's guarantee. 19 In the past, 20 restruc-
turing was accompanied by rescheduling, in which new commercial bank
loans and new IMF loans were granted together with postponement of
capital repayments and arrangements for longer maturities for existing
(Brookings Inst. Press 2003); see generally, R.P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS
DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET (Kluwer 1999).
19. BUTTERWORTH'S BUSINESS AND LAW DICTIONARY (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2002).
20. The dynamics of rescheduling have changed significantly because of the change in
the creditors' profile. The earlier creditors to sovereign borrowers tended to be
commercial banks, which were relatively few and were interested in long-term re-
lationships with the debtor nations; while today's creditors tend to be numerous
and geographically dispersed bond holders. Bondholders are much more difficult
to coordinate than commercial banks. See Bradlow, supra note 2, at 190.
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commercial bank loans. 2'
This possible solution is in practice merely an adjournment of virtually
unchanged obligations. True, it allows the debtor country to survive a
crisis and to live to see another day of debt servicing after the default or
potential default that brought the rescheduling about, but given the enor-
mity of the debt burden on most developing countries, this method ap-
pears to circumvent the real problem and provide only a temporary
solution. In any event, the restructuring exercise may be frustrated if a
creditor or a group of creditors refuse to join in or institutes court action
against the sovereign. While it is true that the there are some legislative
measures22 and some market practices such as the "collective action
clauses" 23 to discourage the recalcitrant creditors from going it alone,2 4
rescheduling remains to a large extent a voluntary exercise that does not
guarantee a positive outcome for the debtor. When dissenting creditors
have insisted on their contractual rights and sued the sovereign debtors,
the courts have in nearly all cases upheld the terms of the contract and
found in favor of the creditors.2 5
With the benefit of hindsight, rescheduling can more appropriately be
viewed as having done the necessary groundwork for an efficient secon-
dary market 26 since many debts with different characteristics were
streamlined into fairly standardized financial instruments capable of be-
ing widely traded. Rescheduling was a necessary facilitation of trade in
these "instruments," because it made them readily exchangeable as if
they were commodities, due to the similarity of their terms.2 7 That view
would therefore characterize rescheduling as the mainstay of a different
proposed solution, rather than an answer to the debt problem in its own
right.
21. Ross P. Buckley, Rescheduling as the Groundwork for Secondary Markets in Sover-
eign Debt, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 299, 301 (1998). For rescheduling under
the Paris Club, see Alexis Rieffel, The Role of the Paris Club in Managing Debt
Problems, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE No. 161 (Princeton Univ. 1985);
UNITAR/DFM, NEGOTIATION OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, LESSON 13: THE
PARIS CLUB (UNITAR/DFM Online Course, 2005), http://www.unitar.org/dfm.
For rescheduling under the London Club, see UNITAR/DFM, NEGOTIATION OF
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, LESSON 15: RENEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMERCIAL
CREDITORS: THE LONDON CLUB (UNITAR/DFM Online Course, 2005) http://
www.unitar.org/dfm.
22. In particular, Italy and Belgium have enacted legislation to facilitate restructuring
and protect investors.
23. Collective Action Clauses (CACs) permit a supermajority of creditors, say 85 per-
cent to agree to a modification of the terms of the instrument and therefore mean
that the minority can be overridden by the majority. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit &
Elizabeth Karpinski, Belize's Innovations, 22 BUTFERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANKING
& FIN. L. 5 (2007).
24. See, e.g., Naoki Ishikawa, Towards the Holy Grail of Orderly Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring Part I: The Use of CACs in Sovereign Debt Financing, 22 BUT-
TERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 333 (2007).
25. See the court cases discussed infra.
26. Buckley, Rescheduling, supra note 21, at 308.
27. Id. at 309.
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2. The Secondary Market in Developing Country Debt
The secondary market in developing country debt is the market for a
states' indebtedness, in which the debts of a country (or of many debtors
in a country) are sold and bought.28 The sale-purchase transaction is usu-
ally at a heavily discounted price and this indeed is the main attraction for
the purchaser of sovereign debt. The market provides the opportunity
for commercial banks or other creditors to rid themselves of bad debt at
some (albeit small) return, whilst speculators are afforded the opportu-
nity to take a chance on the repayment capabilities of the sovereign na-
tions by whom the debts are owed, or on the expectations of the market
in this regard.29 The courts have specifically endorsed such transactions
in distressed debt even when they were entered into at a significant dis-
count and with a view to commencing litigation almost immediately. An
English court has held that "an assignment of a mere right to litigation is
bad, .... but an assignment of property is valid, even though that property
may be incapable of being recovered without litigation. '30 Debtor na-
tions, on the other hand, are left in the same position as they were before
the sale of their debts, if not in a worse state, due to the likely nature of
their new creditors. The latter will, by definition, wish to make a profit by
reselling their "investments," or worse still, by litigating, or more usually
threatening litigation in accordance with their strict legal rights under the
agreements, 31 in order to enforce their returns. Many creditors have suc-
cessfully litigated against sovereign debtors on the basis of the loan inter-
ests obtained in the secondary market. The common starting point by the
courts was that the sovereign debtor was not immune from suit because it
had engaged in a commercial transaction, 32 and thus the foreign state and
its central bank were generally amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
(for example in England or New York). Furthermore, the property of the
foreign state or its central bank may be the subject of execution proceed-
ings if immunity has been waived as far as enforcement is concerned.33
28. More broadly, the secondary loan market is one where the owner of an interest in
a loan can deal in that loan by trading it or in any other way transacting in the loan
interest. See AGASHA MUGASHA, THE LAW OF MULTI-BANK FINANCING: SYNDI-
CATED LOANS AND THE SECONDARY LOAN MARKET (Oxford Univ. Press 2007);
THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING (Allison Taylor & Alicia
Sansone eds., McGraw-Hill 2006).
29. Theodore Allegaert, Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor Nations, or How to Play
Darts, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 429, 429-30 (1997). See also RuMu SARKAR,
DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 113 (Kluwer 1999).
30. Camdex Int'l Ltd. v. Bank of Zambia, [1998] Q.B. 22, 40 (CA.).
31. Allegaert, supra note 29, at 430.
32. In the United States, see Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607
(1992).
33. Under English law, the State Immunity Act of 1978 precludes recovery against a
sovereign debtor. The immunity is lost, however, if the dispute involves any loan
or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in
respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation or if immunity
has been expressly waived in respect of the transaction concerned (section 3(3)).
A similar, but not identical position is provided for in the United States in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976. See also Charles Proctor, Sovereign Debt
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The dangers of court action by purchasers of sovereign debt in the sec-
ondary market are very real as illustrated by the Dart34 case. The Dart
family bought up so much Brazilian debt that within a year they owned
the fourth largest share of such indebtedness, having bought it on the
secondary market for discounts of 60 percent or more. In 1993, when
Brazil requested its creditors to allow it to convert approximately one-
third of its debt, including the Dart family holdings, into bonds at much
less than face value, the Darts refused in an attempt to "free ride" on the
backs of the other creditors and achieve for themselves a much better
deal than the commercial banks and the finance ministry, without causing
the negotiations to collapse. If this "hijacking" of the process was not
enough, the family sued a year later, the first possible day on which they
were permitted to do this,35 claiming accelerated repayment of both the
principal and the interest. The court denied the request to accelerate the
principal, but did not dismiss the right to have the $60 million in overdue
interest paid. The parties eventually settled and Brazil agreed to pay $25
million in cash and $52.3 million in bonds, with the practical effect that
the court's decision clearly worked in Dart's favor. Clearly, this type of
profiteering is an unpleasant consequence of what would otherwise be an
ingenious idea. It must surely render the scheme worse than useless from
the debtor countries' point of view, as there is the likelihood of them
being required to pay more of their debts sooner than if their debts had
never been restructured in the first place.36 But the advantages of the
secondary market for the original-party-come-seller of debt are over-
whelming. 37 This is clearly a solution for creditors but not for debtors.38
Such lawsuits are common worldwide. There is some remarkable simi-
larity in the profile and action on the part of the creditors, and some fair
amount of predictability on the part of the courts in England and the
United States. Concerning the creditors' profile, the purchase of the debt
has typically been a financial institution such as a vulture fund, hedge
fund, or trust that specializes in trading distressed debt. The new creditor
proceeded to institute court action3 9 and, after successful litigation,
sought to enforce the judgment debt against the property of the debtor.
For example, in Kensington International Ltd. v. Republic of Congo,40
Restructuring and the Courts-Some Recent Developments, Part 1, BUTrERWORTH'S
J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 379 (2003).
34. CIBC Bank & Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F.
Supp. 1105, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
35. CIBC sued on behalf of the family as the holder of record of the debt.
36. Allegaert, supra note 29, at 446-47.
37. Id. at 443-44.
38. Id. The secondary market has other advantages that are not relevant here. Most
importantly, it provides liquidity for the financial markets and makes loans more
available. Lenders can commit to loans with the knowledge that the loans can be
sold if it should become necessary.
39. See, e.g., Argo Fund Ltd. v. Essar Steel Ltd., [2006] E.W.C.A. 241 (Civ.).
40. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo, [2006] 2 B.C.L.C. 296 (Q.B.). The
judgment debt was $121,365,437.70; and interest was accruing at a daily rate of
$22,008.23.
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Kensington was the judgment creditor to the sovereign government and it
had obtained its creditor status by way of assignment of four loan agree-
ments. The creditor successfully enforced its judgment by obtaining a
third party order, whereby the court permitted the creditor to attach the
proceeds of two consignments of oil that the court held to belong to the
debtor nation. In Camdex International Ltd. v. Bank of Zambia,'4 1 the
vulture fund obtained the sovereign debt by assignment, reduced it into a
judgment debt, and proceeded to seek enforcement by freezing the
debtor's assets. When the creditor failed to enforce the judgment in that
way, it sought to enforce by way of a garnishee order.42 Similar action on
the part of the creditor was seen in Cardinal Finance Investments Corp. v.
Central Bank of Yemen, 43 where a fund acquired promissory notes at sig-
nificant discount and sought summary judgment for the face value of the
notes. In Donegal International Ltd. v. Zambia,44 the original creditor to
Zambia was Romania, which then assigned its interest to the claiming
fund. Zambia resisted the claim on many grounds, including the allega-
tion, which was upheld by the court, that the claimant had improperly
sought and obtained information about the sovereign borrower and that
the debtor was required to pay a penal interest rate.
These cases in the English courts were mirrored by cases in United
States courts such as CIBC Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd. v.
Banco Central do Brasil,4 5 Elliott Associates v. Banco de La Nacion,46
Salah Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia,47 and EM Ltd. v. Republic of Ar-
gentina.48 Of course, each case was decided on its merits and the deci-
sions are different. But one can make safe generalizations when
comparing and contrasting the two jurisdictions. First, the debtor always
failed whenever it raised the defense relating to sovereign immunity.
Secondly, the courts in the United States and England adopted a com-
mon position that the debtor who failed to pay its debts on time was
liable to the creditor regardless of the reason for the failure to pay and
the consequences the debtor might face. The general approach of the
English courts differed from that generally followed in the United States
when it came to the policy considerations that apply to a sovereign debtor
41. Camdex, [1998] Q.B. at 22 (Civ.).
42. Camdex Int'l Ltd. v. Bank of Zambia, [1997] C.L.C. 714 (Civ.).
43. Cardinal Fin. Inv. Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Yemen, [2001] Lloyd's Rep. Bank 1
(Civ.) (denying Central Bank of Yemen's motion for dismissal of claim brought by
Cardinal for breach of contract).
44. Donegal Int'l Ltd. v. Zambia, [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 397 (Q.B.).
45. CIBC Bank, 886 F. Supp. at 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
46. Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). The same
facts of this case gave rise to litigation in Belgium in which the court adopted a
novel interpretation of the pari passu clause. See Elliott Assocs. L.P., General
Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26,
2000). That interpretation was overturned in Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Invs.
& Euroclear Bank, S.A., No. 2003/KR/334 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 9th
Chamber, Mar. 19, 2004).
47. Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002).
48. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15975 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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in financial difficulty. English courts were more sensitive to the fact that
they were dealing with sovereign states and treaded warily where the
debtor had an arguable case. 49 In exercising their discretion to grant or
refuse remedies, English courts took into account the public functions of
a sovereign state and its legal system, and declined to enforce against
assets that were of little value to the creditor but which could be impor-
tant to the debtor nation in the context of its national economy. 50 It
could as well be that, from this sample of cases, United States courts are
more amenable to the interests of the creditor as far as enforcement of a
judgment is concerned, while English courts are more amenable to the
interests of the debtor. It bears emphasis, however, that both jurisdic-
tions are united on the premise that debts must be paid; in any case, many
borrowers might not have the choice as to forum where an action against
them might be instituted.
Other variations of debt re-framing have been tried or could be sug-
gested, such as securitization, 51 or eradication of the interest on the debts,
but all of these options require the debtor countries to continue to pay
enormous sums of its currency reserves,5 2 which by definition they can ill
afford. These solutions are consistent, however, with the sovereign states'
fulfillment of their obligations under the agreements (at any rate the
agreements as amended), and the commercial interests of the creditors.
There is also considerable debate about whether such arrangements, es-
pecially in the case of the heightened threat of litigation, might encourage
states in difficulty to seek the help of the IMF at an earlier stage5 3 and
whether this might or might not 54 be helpful to the country's long-term
economic health since IMF help comes complete with "austerity mea-
sures" that the country must implement 55 that may promote stability.
3. Debt-for-Equity Swaps
The concept of a debt-for-equity swap is that upon buying their own
debt that has already been sold on the secondary market. Developing
countries' governments exchange the debt with the offer to investors of
equity interests in nationalized industries or local currency bonds.56 In
other instances the debt is exchanged straight for full or par-ownership of
49. See, e.g., Donegal [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 397; Cardinal [2001] Lloyd's Rep. Bank
1; Camdex, [1998] Q.B. at 22.
50. See Proctor, supra note 33, part 3.
51. SARKAR, supra note 6, at 116-17; Ruth Rosauer, Note, Emerging Market Debt In-
struments Play Siren Song for Pension Plans, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 211, 220-
21 (1998).
52. See Allegaert, supra note 29, 437.
53. Id. at 436.
54. Dan Taylor, The International Monetary Fund: Wallet Sore to the West or Savior to
the Global Financial Crisis? 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 79, 80 (1999).
55. Allegaert, supra note 29, 467.
56. SARKAR, supra note 6, at 114; Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31
STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 328-29 (1995); see generally Daniel H. Cole, Debt-Equity
Conversions, Debt-for Nature Swaps, and the Continuing World Debt Crisis, 30
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57 (1992).
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a state enterprise or interest in a state enterprise. The mutual hope is that
such companies or instruments can generate a return to satisfy the credi-
tors, whilst developing country governments are freed from paying inter-
est on their debt burden.57 This appears to be a wonderful idea, although
there is still a high risk involved for investors, and repayments are still
being collected from the greater government purse. Additionally, inves-
tors have not always relished the conditions upon which such equity is
offered, either in terms of the discounts being operated, or the restric-
tions on investments. 58
Debt-for-nature swaps are another variation of this type of policy, in
which debtor countries' environmental co-operation is bought on the sec-
ondary debt market.59 It is submitted that this is not altogether a satisfac-
tory solution to the debt problem both because it "excuses" creditor
countries from their environments obligations and because it only ex-
changes the debtor state's economic burden for a performance obligation
that is likely to be at least as costly, particularly for underdeveloped in-
dustries whose current running costs their owners can ill afford.
The weakness in all of the above-mentioned schemes is that in attempt-
ing to balance the creditors' interests with those of the debtors, the latter
are still required to pay hard currency they simply cannot afford. This is
not to ignore the fact that the debtors contracted the debt in the first
instance and utilized it, but is to acknowledge the debilitating effect of
excessive debt. The choice is simple: either the creditors continue to re-
quire recompense for their extension of credit and therefore the debtor
countries continue to suffer, or the debt will have to be terminated either
through insolvency or forgiveness. The following section discusses the ar-
guments in favor of, and against insolvency and debt forgiveness.
B. SOVEREIGN INSOLVENCY
It has been suggested that an international bankruptcy forum be estab-
lished, to which a debtor nation in serious financial crisis could submit its
monetary affairs and deal with all its creditors in an orderly fashion. It
must be emphasized at the outset that most of the proposals used the
word "bankruptcy" in the broader sense more commonly associated with
the United States, which is different from the meaning associated with
English law. The proposals essentially put forward a legal framework for
a restructuring mechanism. The use of the word "bankruptcy," however,
made the proposals repugnant to a great many debtor countries because
of the meaning associated with the word outside the United States.
"Bankruptcy" under English law and countries that follow the same legal
57. Sean M. Neal, Note, Bringing Developing Nations on Board the Climate Change
Protocol: Using Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Implement the Clean Development
Mechanism, 11 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 163, 170 (1998).
58. See Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Dept
Trading From 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1802, 1832-33 (1998).
59. Neal, supra note 57, at 170.
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tradition is pervading and has far-reaching consequences that make the
bankrupt a "third-class" citizen. Bankruptcy carries much more stigma in
other jurisdictions than it does in the United States, and the proposals
made a very unwelcome entry on terminology alone.
Following this terminological clarification, it becomes evident that
much of the discourse has focused on creating the most effective proce-
dures and methods for renegotiating and rescheduling sovereign debt. A
particular problem that occupies the minds of the commentators and that
is sought to be resolved is that of hold-out creditors who refuse to join in
the renegotiation. The various proposals therefore focus on ensuring that
all creditors support or are bound by the renegotiation effort. Some of
the proposals argue for the use of market-oriented methods, whereby the
parties would provide in their contracts for what would happen if the
debt were to be renegotiated and whereby the courts would enforce such
contracts.60 Other proposals would favor the use of a statute-like proce-
dure along the lines of bankruptcy legislation. 61 A different permutation
was added in 2004 in relation to Iraq's sovereign debt whereby the U.N.
Security Council passed a resolution that effectively prevented creditors
from attaching Iraq's assets (mainly oil revenues) when the country had
more debts than funds.
First and most notably, the proposal for an International Bankruptcy
Agency was made at the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Halifax, Ca-
nada in June 1995 in the wake of the Mexican financial crisis earlier that
year. 62 Mexico faced capital flight in January 1995; foreign investors sud-
denly realized that Mexico had an external debt of $29 billion falling due
in 1995, but the central bank had reserves of only $6 billion. The credi-
tors anticipating a default refused to roll-over (extend) their debt, and
either demanded repayment or withdrew their money. These actions
brought Mexico to the brink of default. Eventually the United States
government organized a rescue package of $50 billion, largely by arm-
twisting several institutions into cooperation, 63 but the episode led to the
realization that there was a vacuum in international financial manage-
ment, where investors could relocate capital with extraordinary speed,
thus making a debtor nation vulnerable to capital movement that may
sometimes be speculative or irrational.
The idea of an international bankruptcy forum/agency, meaning an in-
stitution to coordinate restructuring, has been supported in a case such as
Mexico's where there was speculative creditor panic and the debtor na-
60. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Note, Sovereign Bonds and the Collec-
tive Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002).
61. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV 956, 966 (2000) (see the IMF proposal).
62. See John H. Chun, Note, "Post-Modern" Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need
an International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2651-52 (1996).
The G7 also proposed the establishment of an Emergency Financing Mechanism
that would double the General Agreement to Borrow (the amount available at the
IMF). This would essentially equip better the function of lender of last resort.
63. Id. at 2659-663.
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tion suffered only a short-term liquidity crisis rather than a solvency cri-
sis. 64 The bankruptcy forum would protect the debtor by stopping
investors relocating their funds from a sovereign government that is fac-
ing a financial crisis. It would also mutually benefit the creditors and the
debtor nation by facilitating an orderly re-negotiation of the debt. Fur-
thermore, it would benefit the international financial system by minimiz-
ing contagion and maintaining confidence in the international financial
system. 65
Secondly, some commentators have suggested an insolvency procedure
for debtor nations based the approach taken by private law towards debt-
ors, and in recognition of the fact that many domestic systems of law pro-
vide for bankruptcy procedures that could be harmonized into a global
procedure. It has been suggested that in all situations where the debtor
cannot satisfy all creditors, even it if is a sovereign debtor, the so-called
common-pool-problem arises.66 Once the resistance to calling govern-
ment sovereigns "insolvent" rather than "temporarily illiquid" has been
overcome, and the predominant principle that a state cannot be made
bankrupt, the private law rules on insolvency can be applied by compari-
son or directly to sovereign debtors. 67 The desirability of an insolvency
procedure at the level of nations, it is argued, lies in the disciplinary effect
it would have on all participants-debtors and creditors-because it would
create an incentive for mutually agreed solutions.
Thirdly, some IMF officials, perhaps reflecting mainstream philosophy
in recent years, actively considered the idea of sovereign insolvency along
with the alternative of debt restructuring. 68 The idea, which was not new
at all, arose from the realization that efforts to curb the debt crisis had
64. Id. at 2659, 2691. Mexico did not have the cash at hand to redeem its obligations,
but generally it had the resources to repay the debt.
65. Id. at 2676.
66. The problem of the common pool illustrates the advantages of cooperative action.
Imagine a small lake filled with fish. Consider the following two scenarios: (a) if a
single individual owns the lake, he will limit the amount of fishing. This is so that
fish will be able to reproduce, and this will ensure that there will be fish in the
future; (b) If no one person owns the lake, and a group of self-interested people
use the lake for fishing, each will try to maximize the amount of fish caught. Even
though everyone will realize that they would all benefit if they limited the amount
of fishing, each one soon discovers that any self-imposed limits on fishing do not
ensure that the fish would remain. Self-interest would dictate that each catches as
much fish as possible, despite the interest of the group to preserve the fish. If
there were a law regulating fishing, everyone would benefit.
This supports the theory that creditors will be better off if they act as a group.
The law of debt, whereby each creditor can pursue individual remedies, is modi-
fied to benefit all. Thus bankruptcy law steps in and forces the diverse creditors
with competing interests to act collectively.
There are some fallacies in the problem of the common pool. First, it assumes
that each individual is self-interested; in fact, many are cooperative. Secondly, in
practice creditors do not always rush to seize assets - sometimes they allow restruc-
turing. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THOMAS H. JACKSON & BARRY E. AD-
LER, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 22-24 (3d ed. 2001).
67. Christoph G. Paulus, Some Thoughts on an Insolvency Procedure for Countries, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 532 (2002).
68. See also Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 958-59.
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hitherto been mainly political, but that they should be transformed into a
workable procedure and thereby be given a legal grounding.69 It was re-
alized that the existing framework for negotiations was inefficient be-
cause it was solely contractual and required unanimity of all the creditors.
The framework could thus be derailed by a party that did not agree to the
direction of the negotiations and that created problems in practice.
The IMF favored and developed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM), which would consist of a procedure for sovereign
debtors to submit to a designated institution or body. It was considered
that both the institution and the procedure would be fairly easy to imple-
ment by treaty, which would be implemented perhaps by way of amend-
ment to the IMF Articles of Agreement, and thus be binding on the
international financial community. The mechanism would provide for a
mandatory stay on enforcement procedures, majority decisions that
would be binding on all creditors, and a "priority" incentive for creditors
to keep credit lines open during the renegotiation.70 The proposed re-
structuring mechanism was considered to have a greater likelihood of be-
ing effected than the alternative of relying on collective action clauses for
the orderly restructuring of debt.71 In order to be effective, collective
action clauses would need to be enforceable in all the courts, which would
require all the courts of the world to work to the same principle, or would
need to be legislated for across all jurisdictions to avoid forum shop-
ping.72 Less creditworthy nations may also find it difficult to negotiate
such clauses, and in any case the clauses would only apply to future obli-
gations and thus take a long while to start before becoming effective. 73
A bankruptcy regime in the form of the SDRM would have three fac-
tors to consider when a country is facing liquidity crisis and needs to rene-
gotiate its debts with its creditors, in the face of the risk that creditors can
relocate money worldwide with extraordinary speed: (1) the mechanism's
ability to respond quickly and decisively to creditor panic; (2) the mecha-
nism's ability to minimize moral hazard; and (3) the mechanism's ability
to respond to multiple and simultaneous creditor panics.74 The merit of
the international bankruptcy regime recognizes that financial systems
have evolved faster than institutional structures, and there is no interna-
tional or mutually acceptable procedure to deal with capital flight.75 And
while domestic systems have protections for debtors and creditors, there
69. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, Address at Na-
tional Economics' Club Annual Members' Dinner: International Financial Archi-
tecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26,
2006) (transcript available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001112601.htm).
70. See also Proctor, supra note 33, part 3.
71. The proposal was not adopted but work continues on it. Private institutions at-
tacked it because it did not restrict their contractual rights to enforce debts against
sovereign lenders. It was also attacked by poorer nations because it would have
made borrowing on the international markets more expensive for them.
72. See Krueger, supra note 69.
73. See Proctor, supra note 33.
74. Chun, supra note 62, at 2687-692.
75. Id. at 2668.
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is no similar arrangement in the international context. 76
One model that has been suggested for the international bankruptcy
regime is chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which protects munici-
palities from creditor panics and averts economic chaos. In broad out-
line, if a sovereign debtor submitted to this bankruptcy procedure, it
would get some breathing space to re-negotiate with its creditors and
would be assured of cooperative action by all creditors.77 This would be
achieved through four key elements: 78 (1) the automatic stay;79 (2) the
post-petition creditor preference;80 (3) the plan of readjustment;8 and (4)
the cram-down provision. 82 Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code af-
fords the municipalities procedural protections from impermissible inter-
ference by creditors, and parallel provisions would similarly protect
sovereign debtors.83 Municipalities are not subject to involuntary bank-
ruptcy petitions and they have the exclusive right to file the plan of ad-
justment.84 Unlike chapter 11, under which the court may appoint a
76. Id. at 2671.
77. The International Bankruptcy Agency would be in the nature of an arbitration
forum, organized under the auspices of the IMF. As an arbitral tribunal, it would
have the key advantages that its proceedings would generally be less contentious
than court proceedings, and the parties can establish the procedural rules and reg-
ulations that would govern the reorganization. Parties would voluntarily submit to
its jurisdiction, and the adoption of chapter 9 type of proceedings (infra) would
ensure that there is no direct interference in the political and economic affairs of
the debtor nation. See id. at 2676-79.
78. Id. at 2672.
79. The effect of an automatic stay provision is that, upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition, all creditors, and other parties in interest, are automatically prevented,
for a period of thirty days, from commencing or continuing lawsuits and enforcing
or collecting claims or judgments against the debtor. This prevents the creditors
from harassing the debtor, and promotes orderly administration of the debtor's
assets and also avoids their dissipation. See id. at 2674.
80. The post-petition creditor preference provisions facilitate the injection of new re-
sources into the debtor so that it carries on business as usual. The provision per-
mits the municipality/debtor to obtain unsecured credit by granting priority of
repayment over all administrative expenses, unsecured creditors, and junior secur-
ity interests already encumbering the property of the debtor. See id. at 2674-75.
81. A municipality/debtor is required to file a plan of adjustment of its debts, which
may modify the rights of all creditors relating to repayment of principal, interest,
or repayment method. The plan of adjustment is invariably negotiated between the
municipality and creditors to find a mutually acceptable plan for adjusting the
debt. See id. at 2675.
82. A cram-down provision prevents a small minority of creditors from wrecking a
reorganization plan. For the reorganization to work, two requirements need to be
met. First, a qualified majority of lenders must accept the plan of reorganization.
This means that two-thirds of the amount of the claims that consist of one half of
the number of creditors, approve or are not impaired by the plan. Second, the
court must find that the plan "does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equi-
table" in relation to the dissenting and impaired class. The "unfair discrimination"
requirement means that the debtor treats all classes of equal rank identically under
the plan. The "fair and equitable" doctrine requires that senior creditors receive
full payment before junior creditors receive payment. See id. at 2675-76.
83. Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is actually titled, "Adjustment of Debts of
a Municipality."
84. Chapter 9, section 901 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code applies section 301, thus mak-
ing it clear that it is only the municipality that can initiate a plan of its own debt
adjustment. There are no involuntary chapter 9 cases.
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trustee to govern the debtor's affairs,85 chapter 9 protects the rights of the
state to control its political subdivisions86 and the right of the municipal
debtor to manage its governmental and spending priorities without judi-
cial interference. 87
Two alternative procedures have been suggested. The first is an institu-
tion-based procedure, for example the United Nations or any of its subdi-
visions, or the International Court of Justice, that could either act as a
controlling supervisor of the bankruptcy procedure, following the Anglo-
American model of a judge, or have a more invasive influence on the
procedure, following the continental model of a judge. 88 The procedure
would only be debtor-initiated and would put in place an automatic stay
of proceedings against the debtor from the time the debtor submits to
it.89 The second alternative would be an arbitration procedure that has
the flexibility usually associated with arbitration.
Without detracting from the strength of the arguments made in favor of
a bankruptcy approach to developing country debt, proponents of the ap-
proach are concerned with the orderly management of the debt, which
does not go to the core problem of reducing the debt. The proposals
focus on establishing a legal framework for an effective restructuring
mechanism. Some argued that since there are domestic laws regulating
individuals and entities that are in financial difficulty, there could, and
should, be an international body of law or procedure that handles a simi-
lar problem at the international level. Others focused on the desired re-
sult, for example stopping capital flight, and created a solution that would
perhaps solve that problem but not many others. In terms of the value of
the debt, the proposals seemed to offer little practical help beyond what
was already available, for example through the London Club or Paris
Club. The proposals were not carried through because a good proportion
of the creditor community and the debtors did not support them. At the
present time, most commentators, creditors, and debtors prefer the use of
contractual negotiations for establishing the legal framework for debt
renegotiation.
C. DEBT FORGIVENESS
The sheer size of developing country external debt in relation to the
ability to service the debt, coupled with the cyclic nature of the debt led
many individuals, groups, and governments to call for debt forgiveness in
part or in full. One basis for this proposition is that less than half of the
payments made by developing countries go towards retiring the principal
debt because most of the payments go to payment of interest. Various
85. U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104-06 (2000 & Supp. IV).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2000 & Supp. IV).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2000 & Supp. IV).
88. Paulus, supra note 67, at 542-43. The procedure would exclude the IMF and the
World Bank because they are creditors.
89. Id. at 551.
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arguments have been made in favor of debt forgiveness, which is also
called debt relief, debt alleviation, debt remission, or cancellation of debt.
1. Why Forgive the Debt?
a. Moral Arguments
Forgiveness of debt is founded on the kinship of the human spirit-that
there is a bond between all human beings that overrides material differ-
ences and inequalities.90 This is more often articulated by religious
groups, but the argument is not the exclusive domain of religious convic-
tion. The fundamental tenets of international human rights law provide
for the principle of universal human dignity, and "the belief that human
solidarity requires action by all to ensure that the dignity of all is recog-
nized and protected." 91
In favor of developing countries, it has been further suggested, contro-
versially, that the western creditors who seek to enforce their loan con-
tracts against particular developing countries should refrain from doing
so, in recognition of the fact that for centuries the colonial powers plun-
dered the human and natural resources of these nations without ever of-
fering compensation or restitution, which in any case would be impossible
in the case of the slave trade, due to the infinite worth of each individual
who was stolen. The question then becomes who are really the creditors
and who the debtors?
Finally, there is another forceful argument that the developed nations
lured developing nations into the debt trap by making easy credit availa-
ble, and they now have a moral obligation to get them out.92
b. Economic Arguments
Debt reduction is in the interests of all countries in the world, particu-
larly the western world. Developing countries that are free of debt will
expand economically and will become more viable partners with whom
the western countries can do business. Secondly, the debt burden directly
deprives the people in the poor countries of the basic conditions of sur-
vival, later on prosperity. It thus ties up the human capital in these peo-
ple, which largely remains untapped and unavailable to the development
process. Thirdly, debt forgiveness would have a positive re-distributive
effect of global resources. The resources capable of wiping out the entire
debt of the developing nations would do more good to the global econ-
omy than it would if it were added to the wealth of the rich nations.93 If
the debt obligations are enforced, a great many people will continue to
starve, or die of preventable diseases, or continue to lack a basic educa-
90. Thomas, supra note 5, at 1713.
91. Id. at 1714.
92. See Jens J. Wilhelmsen, Pushing for Debt Forgiveness, FOR A CHANGE MAGAZINE,
Aug. 1, 2000.
93. This is called the diminishing marginal utility of money. See Thomas, supra note 5,
at 1715-16.
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tion. If, on the other hand those debts are cancelled, the banks' and in-
vestors' profits are simply reduced, or at worst they will lose a substantial
investment. The two are hardly comparable!
The last and perhaps weakest argument is the commercial banks' own
contributory fault in continuing to lend to defaulting nations, 94 which
should stop them from seeking to recover these "bad debts." It is submit-
ted that this argument should fail, both because the debtor countries were
equally at fault in continuing to borrow and, conversely, that in the face
of the prevailing circumstances, both parties were justified in continuing
the arrangement without closely scrutinizing the possible consequences.
c. Political Arguments
Perhaps the most compelling reason for debt forgiveness is that it is
critical to ensuring political security and international peace. Severe pov-
erty is often a source of political strife. Developing country external debt
has the potential, if unchecked, to provoke instability and disorder of all
kinds due to dissatisfaction with poverty on a massive scale. 95 Further-
more, "[t]he political legitimacy of the current order is undermined when
the world's powers stand by and allow the world's poor to suffer and even
to die. Conversely, the political legitimacy of the current order is rein-
forced when the world's powers join the world's poor in partnership. 96
d. Legal Arguments
The legal arguments for debt forgiveness are premised on the idea that
unsustainable debt is a challenge to the world order, and debt forgiveness
is a critical component in securing international prosperity and interna-
tional peace. 97 Debt and debt forgiveness are, thus, a challenge for inter-
national law. There are general principles of human dignity and self-
determination that make a case for forgiveness. For instance, The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that the "inherent dignity
.... of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world." 98 Furthermore, article 1 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights grants all people the right of
self-determination which includes the right to "freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development," 99 and states that "[i]n no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." 100
94. See, e.g., id. at 1714.
95. Buckley, Facilitation, supra note 58, at 1803; Thomas, supra note 5, at 1716 (adding
that a population that is decimated and destabilized by disease is vulnerable to
strife and unrest).
96. Thomas, supra note 5, at 1716.
97. Id. at 1717.
98. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 1 1
(Dec. 10, 1948).
99. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
1, 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).
100. Id. 2; see also Thomas, supra note 5, at 1717.
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e. Against Forgiveness
It is also possible to find many arguments that stand in the way of debt
forgiveness, but all of them pale into insignificance in comparison with
the sheer human need caused by maintaining the debt obligations of de-
veloping countries. For example, two similar arguments would protest
that the effect of canceling debt would destroy confidence in less devel-
oped countries' creditworthiness, or that it would destroy confidence in
the secondary market in sovereign debt. It is evident, however, that in
many cases, such confidence is only a chimera anyway.
The only remaining argument is the disappearance of all "sticks" and
"carrots" from the IMF's pantry and the resultant freedom developing
countries would have over their own economies and foreign investment
rules. The former could well cause problems in the future, although it
would restore a measure of these countries' sovereignty, with which they
have the right to do as they see fit. It is also becoming increasingly obvi-
ous that foreign investment in developing country economies squeezes
out local investment and enterprise, so that returning control over this
matter is likely to benefit these fledgling economies.
Debt forgiveness is not easy to achieve, though, whether for the IMF or
creditor governments, which must face the difficulties inherent in the
public relations problems that would follow, especially if taxpayers'
money were at stake.
2. The Implementation of Debt Forgiveness
The bulk of the external debt for the poorest of sovereign states is
owed to official or multilateral creditors. Forgiveness of official debt
would be done by unilateral government action of the creditor nation.
Recently the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of these efforts,
but many nations of the world have played their part as well. Groups of
creditor states, for example the Paris Club or the G10, may agree on a
common course of action, but ultimately the implementation of the deci-
sion lies with individual creditor nations.
Debt forgiveness may similarly be at the level of international financial
institutions; for instance, the IMF through the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries program. Such forgiveness would have to fall within the ambit
of the constituting document, for instance the Articles of Agreement.
3. Articles of Agreement of the IMF: The Purposes of the IMF
In addition to the primordial purpose of promoting international mon-
etary co-operation, the other purposes of the IMF, as listed in article I of
the Articles of Agreement are as follows:
(ii) To facilitate . . . balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels
of employment and real income and to the development of the pro-
ductive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic
policy.
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(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange ar-
rangements...
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources
of the Fund temporarily available to them ... with opportunity to
correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resort-
ing to measures destructive of national ... prosperity.10 1
It is immediately apparent, that some of the IMF's fundamental princi-
ples can be used for debt relief. It is certainly true that there are other
Fund objectives that conflict with the ones mentioned above,10 2 and those
whose outworking is more favorable to creditors have been allowed to
take precedence. It has been authoritatively suggested by Sir Joseph
Gold, however, that the articles should be interpreted by deciding "which
purpose or purposes ... are to be given decisive weight in order to in-
crease the likelihood that over time all the purposes of the fund can be
realized."1 0 3
V. CONCLUSION
The expressions "sovereign insolvency" and "international bank-
ruptcy" when used the context of sovereign debt really mean sovereign
debt restructuring. To parties outside the United States, it is therefore
terminologically incorrect to present the choice facing an illiquid sover-
eign debtor as that between "bankruptcy" and "forgiveness." The choice
is really between restructuring and forgiveness. The use of the "bank-
ruptcy" and "insolvency" terminology has caused animosity to the idea of
restructuring among debtor nations because the two words attract un-
pleasant meaning in different legal cultures. Much of the debate about
international insolvency or bankruptcy has ebbed because there is now a
functional and generally acceptable legal framework for restructuring
sovereign debt. While the legal framework is still in its infancy and for
that reason it could be labeled as ad hoc, the majority of external debts
are restructured on the basis of the contractual provisions inserted in the
credit documents while other debts are restructured through the IMF, the
Paris Club, and the London Club.
Many of the restructuring deals involve debt write- off as a practical
business solution, which means that debt forgiveness and restructuring or
the so-called "sovereign insolvency" are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
forgiveness and restructuring are very compatible and can be utilized to
great effect as long as the ultimate result is debt sustainability. It is not
possible to make gold out of thin air and for that reason the loss must fall
upon either the creditors or the debtors. The former may attempt to
recoup some of their losses through discounting bonds in the secondary
market, but a clear choice must be made between attempting to balance
debtor and creditor interests, (which half satisfies the creditors, yet fails
101. IMF, supra note 7, cl. (ii), (iii) & (v) (emphasis added).
102. Allegaert, supra note 29, at 450-51.
103. Id. at 451.
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completely to do away with the debtor's debt) and deciding to eradicate
the debt problem at the creditors' expense. This paper concludes that the
latter option is essential. The idea is also in the ascendancy in what is a
life-and-death situation for so many millions of people. Ultimately, how-
ever, debt alleviation has to be funded by the richer nations; so it be-
comes a matter of balancing their domestic policies with debt alleviation.
This underscores further realities, at least for official creditors.
First, there must be the double coincidence of the ability and willing-
ness to forgive the debt. Granted that debt forgiveness means that credi-
tor nations forego opportunities for their own people, public opinion
oscillates whether or not to forgive debtor nations. The overwhelming
sentiment in a particular creditor nation may favor forgiveness at a partic-
ular time and not another. Decision makers must get the timing right as
far as the sentiments for debt forgiveness are concerned. Secondly, the
debt can only be forgiven on certain conditions. In the past, this meant
that debt forgiveness was usually conditional on meeting some economic
tests and undertaking some further economic reforms. It was also a com-
mon requirement that the debtor nations embark on some corporate gov-
ernance and democratization processes. These are reasonable conditions,
if only for the debtor nations to be seen giving the assurance that they are
doing their best in the economic and political management of their af-
fairs. Finally, debt forgiveness fundamentally tilts geo-political power in
favor of the creditor nations, if that were not the case already. The cur-
rent debt crisis means that, technically, some countries are insolvent.
Even though the nations of the world do not use that particular expres-
sion, debtor and creditor nations deal with one another with mutual ap-
preciation of the fact. This increases the relative strength of the creditor
nations in all spheres of life. This can be both a good and bad thing. For
instance, it means that the debtor nations lose a certain amount of control
over their own decisions. On the other hand, it means that there will be
some external input to some major decisions.
The problem of unsustainable debt is part of the intractable wider
problem of underdevelopment and poverty. The many part-solutions to
the complex problem of underdevelopment and poverty also constitute
part solutions to developing country external debt. 10 4 Solutions to the
debt crisis, though, cannot be the same for all countries. Middle-income
developing countries have a menu of options available to them, for exam-
ple securitization, secondary markets, renegotiation that offers debt
write-off, debt-for-equity schemes, and other variations. For the poorest
104. Some of the solutions agreed at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005, for facilitat-
ing development progress in Africa included: (1) a doubling of aid; (2) writing-off
immediately substantial debts; (3) a commitment to end export subsidies; (4) sub-
stantial funding for many health initiatives; (5) reduction of conflict; (6) education;
and (7) a requirement for developing countries to "decide, plan and sequence their
economic policies to fit with their own development strategies, for which they
should be accountable to their people." Policy Issues, G8 Gleneagles 2005, http://
www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagenam=openmarket/xcelerate/ (last visited Oct.
23, 2007).
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countries, debt relief is the answer in the form of bilateral debt relief by
individual countries or through the Paris Club, and multilateral debt re-
lief (including the HIPC initiative). Even then, the debt relief would be
only one in a range of approaches towards attaining debt sustainability.
There is consensus at the present time that the development of trade in
developing countries is the most effective approach towards increased
prosperity for those countries and an essential step towards the attain-
ment of the millennium development goals. In addition, the efforts at the
better management of external debt also have a role to play tackling the
problem of external debt.
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